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REGULATION OF HYDRO-ELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT:
STATE VERSUS FEDERAL CONTROL
I.

INTRODUCTION

For assorted reasons,' but fundamentally out of careful concern
for resources close to home, many states attempt to regulate the construction of energy-producing facilities within their borders.2 This
comment specifically examines the regulation of hydro-electric facility
construction on navigable waterways and waterways within the public
domain. Its primary purpose is to evaluate the pre-eminence of federal
over state authority under the Federal Power Act [hereinafter FPA].3
II.

GENESIS OF FEDERAL REGULATION: THE FEDERAL POWER ACT

[I]f we could work out a comprehensive plan under which
the millions of potential horsepower energy now running to
waste in the rivers and streams throughout the various States
of the Union could be developed and utilized for the benefit
and comfort of mankind we would have performed a service
second to none, and worthy to rank with the
4 highest rendered
by any previous Congress in our history.
Passage of the FPA was accomplished at a time when the patriotic
passion of Americans was at a zenith--the United States was fighting
World War I.5 Some members of Congress believed development of
the nation's water resources had been stalled by a fear in the private
sector that construction of hydro-electric facilities, which to that point
had occurred under the sole regulation of the various states, risked
frustration through an abrupt assertion of the federal government's
right to regulate navigable waterways.6 American business would not
risk enormous amounts of labor and capital to watch its efforts
1. See, e.g., MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] §§ 75-20-1011205 (1979). Section 75-20-102 (1979) states:
Policy and legislative findings. (1) It is the constitutionally declared policy of this
state to maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment for present and

future generations, to protect the enviromental life-support systems from degradation and prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources, and
to provide for administration and enforcement to attain these objectives.
2. See the Montana Major Facility Siting Act, MCA §§ 75-20-101-1205 (1979), or
the Wyoming Industrial Development and Siting Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-12-101-121
(1977).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1976 & Supp. 11977 & Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
4. 56 CONG. REC. 9108 (1918) (remarks of Rep. LaFollette).
5. See 56 CONG. REC. 9109 (1918) (remarks of Rep. LaFollette).

6.

The United States Congress is given the power to "[rlegulate commerce with for-

" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. This commerce
eign nations, and among the several states ..
power has been construed to vest the federal government with authority over navigable waterways insofar as that authority involves interstate commerce. Shibely v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1, 40 (1893); Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229, 243 (1912).
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sabotaged by whimsical federal intervention; a federal permit system
was needed. With the threat of unexpected federal involvement eliminated, growing industrial needs could be satisfied with abundant, inexpensive water power.
Quite apart from the bullish rhetoric of the early "Roaring '20s,"
numerous reasons for passage of the FPA were articulated by American courts. It was said the Act encouraged navigation, hydro-electric
development, and productive use of the public lands.7 The fruits of this
economic and social stimulus were to be preserved "to the people," 8
although as will be shown, the generic term "people" ignores the difficult problems of American federalism, namely: Is it the people of the
United States, or the people of Colorado, Wyoming, or Montana that
benefit from facility-siting in their home states?
Congressional regulatory authority over "navigable waterways" is
derived from the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 9
Under the FPA, these waterways are defined as:
those parts of streams or other bodies of water over which
Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, and
which either in their natural or improved condition notwithstanding interruptions between the navigable parts of such
streams or waters by falls, shallows, or rapids compelling land
carriage, are used or suitable for use for the transportation of
persons or property in interstate or foreign commerce, including therein all such interrupting falls, shallows, or rapids together with such other parts of streams as shall have been
authorized by Congress for improvement by the United States
or shall have been recommended to Congress for such improvement after investigation under its authority.' 0
Courts have been prone to a simpler definition. In Rochester Gas
and Electric Corp. v. FederalPower Commission," the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit developed this three-part test: Waters are
"navigable" if (1) they are presently being used, or are suitable for use
as such; (2) they have been used, or were capable of being used as such
in the past; or, (3) they could be made suitable, by reasonable improvements, for such uses in the future,' 2 dams and other man-made obsta7. Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 330 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1964).
8. United States v. Federal Power Comm'n, 191 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1951), aft'd 345
U.S. 153 (1952).
9. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, supra note 6.
10. 16 U.S.C. § 796(8) (1976).
11. 344 F.2d 594 (2nd Cir. 1965).
12. 344 F.2d at 596. Naturally the reader should be familiar with the leading case
which decides the general issue of navigability as it relates to applicability of the federal

1981 HYDRO-ELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT REGULATION

III

des notwithstanding. 3
Very few cases appear' 4 in which the Federal Power Commission's' 5 [hereinafter FPC] control over facility siting has been denied
on the grounds that the waterways in question were "non-navigable."
Despite the paucity of commercially navigable rivers and streams in the
inland West, federal involvement will likely be as prominent in that
region as in others where commercial water traffic actually exists.
Moreover, federal constitutional' 6 and statutory' 7 authority may be exerted over any waterways running within the public lands or reservations of the United States. Obviously in such cases the issue of
navigability does not arise.
Strictly read, the FPA indicates that Congress provided for state
participation in the regulatory process. By theoretical design, where no
genuine federal interest appears, facility siting is regulated solely by the
respective states.I18 For example, nothing in the Act affects the states'
roles in controlling the appropriation of water for irrigation or municipal purposes.' 9 Most importantly, under Section 9(b) of the act, no
commerce power, United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
The United States Supreme Court held:
It is obvious that the uses to which the streams may be put vary from the carriage
of ocean lines to the floating of logs; that the density of traffic varies equally widely
from the busy harbors of the seacoast to the sparsely settled regions of the Western
Mountains. The test as to navigability must take these variations into consideration.
Id at 405-06. The Court further held that: (I) navigability could be considered "in the light
of the effect of reasonable [watercourse] improvements," and, (2) a waterway is not nonnavigable "merely because artificial aids must make the [river] suitable for use before navigation may be undertaken." id at 406-07.
13. See Montana Power Company v. Federal Power Comm'n, 185 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir.
1950).
14. The author found only one reported case in which the river in question was shown
to be non-navigable. Hudson River Regulating Dist. v. Fonda, J. & G.R. Co., 217 N.Y.S.
781, 127 Misc. 866, ai'd,288 N.Y.S. 686, 223 App. Div. 358 (1926).
15. Regulatory functions performed by the Federal Power Commission under the
Federals Power Act were transferred, upon the creation of the Department of Energy in
1977, to either the Secretary of Energy or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 42
U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (Supp. 11 1978).
16. See U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 3:
The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States;
and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of
the United States or of any particular State.
17. 16 U.S.C. § 817 (1976).
18. See Northern N.H. Lumber Co. v. N.H. Water Resources Board, 56 F. Supp. 177,
181 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
19. 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1976):
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as affecting or intending to
affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of the respective States relating to the
control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired therein.
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facility construction permits are to issue except upon a showing of satisfactory evidence, produced by the permit applicant, that it "[h]as complied with the requirements of the laws of the state or states within
which the proposed project is to be located. 2 0° The importance of this
provision is explored in detail below.
The legislative history of the FPA indicates that lawmakers fully
expected states' decisional roles to be amply protected. In explaining
how the federal government would have no plenary power not contemplated by the Constitution, Representative LaFollette put it this way:
Under this bill we only allow the commission of [federal] supervisory power over those functions entirely within the
States' jurisdiction for the period covered by any license the
21
State having exercised its rights in advance of issue [of license]. . . .By the enactment of this bill we shall be able to
develop our water powers recognizing the States' rights as to
water, bed, and bank control. 2 (emphasis added).
Federal authority derived from the navigability doctrine appeared
at the time to be quite limited. As Representative Mondell said:
[I]n other words, the Government would have control of very
little water-power development in the New England States except in the lower courses of the rivers, only partial control on
the South Atlantic seaboard, very little in [Iowa] none of the
streams in the state of Nebraska, and only partial control...
elsewhere.23
The strong possibility that passage of the FPA depended on this narrow
view of the Act's application, taken with the declared legislative purpose that the act was designed to allow the construction of hydro-electric facilities 24 (rather than to affirmatively regulate 25 that
20.

16 U.S.C. § 802(b) (1976):

(b) Satisfactory evidence that the applicant has complied with the requirements of
the laws of the State or States within which the proposed project is to be located
with respect to bed and banks and to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water
for power purposes and with respect to the right to engage in the business of developing, transmitting, and distributing power, and in any other business necessary to
effect the purpose of a license under this chapter.
21. This represents a clear reference to what later became Section 9(b) of the Federal
Power Act.
22. 56 CONG. REc. 9110 (1918) (remarks of Rep. LaFollette).
23. 56 CONG. REC. 9114 (1918) (remarks of Rep. Mondell).
24. Building dams and developing water powers is usually a hazardous and costly
undertaking. Men will not engage in it on uncertainties ... .While the right of
water control and the ownership and jurisdiction of bed and banks of our waterways are admittedly in the states, the jurisdiction over the navigation of all streams
being in the Government of the States could not well pass laws conferring upon
private individuals rights to build dams across the streams, because the Government could intervene and stop proceedings under the plea of control of navigation.
See 56 CONG. REc. 9109 (1918) (remarks of Rep. LaFollette).
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construction), makes the interpretation given the Act by the federal
courts surprising if not incredible.
III.

CONTEST FOR AUTHORITY:

THE CHALLENGE OF SECTION 9(B)

The cry of "Stop thief' was raised, and raged with great violence for a decade, with the result that our Government,
through timberland withdrawals, power-site withdrawals,
coal-land withdrawals, and other withdrawals of various
kinds, backed up by Congress, always alert to what it seems
the people want, swung to the other extreme, and for a decade
*. . now there has been practically no development of water
power. . . throughout the great West. . . with the natural
result following that within a short time our expanding commerce and trade, our manufactories and internal development
had drawn so heavily on coal and oil properties already developed as to cause a rapid increase in the price of those commodities, and in many localities an even worse hardshipthat of not receiving an adequate supply or none at all.26
Originating in Minnesota, the Cedar River flows in a southeasterly
direction 270 miles through Iowa, passing Moscow at a point only 10
miles west of the Mississippi River. From Moscow the Cedar flows
southwesterly for 29 miles, where it converges with the Iowa River at a
point called Columbus Junction, below which the Iowa converges with
the Mississippi. On April 2, 1941, the First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative sought a permit from the FPC to construct an earthen dam on
the Cedar directly north of Moscow. This dam would back the waters
of the Cedar into an 11,000-acre reservoir. Water from the reservoir
would feed an eight-mile diversion canal designed to carry the water to
a hydro-electric dam, planned for construction on the Mississippi at the
town of Muscatine. The project would slow the rate of flow of the
Cedar River at Moscow to about 25 cubic feet per second.
The FPC refused to issue a permit on the grounds that the applicant (First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative) had failed to provide satisfactory evidence of its compliance with Iowa's own statutory
25.

A definition offered by appellant's counsel in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1 (1824),

is helpful here:
"mo regulate" implies in its nature full power over the thing to be regulated, it
excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same operation on the same thing. That regulation is designed for the entire result, applying

in those parts which remain as they were, as well as to those which are altered
....

It produces a uniform whole.

This definition is offered here to illustrate what the text is designed to illustrate: federal
regulation of hydro-electric facility siting works to exclude the action of others (the states)
that would operate in the same field.

26.

56 CONG. REc. 9108 (1918) (remarks of Rep. LaFollette).
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requirements,27 pursuant to Section 9(b) of the FPA.28 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the FPC's ruling, despite
the Cooperative's alternate contentions that either a) the law of Iowa
did not require applicants in their position to secure a state permit, or
b) if the law of Iowa did so require, the law was unconstitutional.29 In
holding that the FPA did not wholly preempt the state of Iowa from at
least sharing in the regulation of facility siting, the court found that
Congress' purpose was to "[s]trengthen and assist state control and regulation, rather than to impair or diminish it. The legislative history of
the Federal Power Act reveal[ed] such an intention. ' 30 The court did
not reach the petitioner's constitutional challenge, since the statutes in
question were "susceptible of an interpretation consistent with constitutionality,"3 1 namely, that the FPA contemplated a dual system of control, consistent with the "[p]lain purpose of Section 9(b)." 2 The state
of Iowa, therefore, was not powerless to deal with attempts at "environmental rearrangement ' 33 within its borders, even when those attempts
took the form of electric facility construction on navigable waterways.34
The Cooperative appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which reversed the court of appeals in FirstIowa Hydro-ElectricCooperative v. FederalPower Commission [hereinafter FirstIowa], 35 that the
FPA did not contemplate a dual system of overlapping final authority,36 but rather a comprehensive system of federal control subject to
the authority "saved" the states by Section 27 of the Act: state laws
were protected from preemption in the limited area of appropriation of
water for use in irrigation and for related uses.37 The Court held that
Section 9(b) required the applicant to furnish the federal licensing authority with evidence of its compliance with the legal requirements of
IOWA CODE § 7767 (1939):
Prohibition-permit. No dam shall be constructed, maintained, or operated in
this state in any navigable or meandered stream for any purpose, or in any other
stream for manufacturing or power purposes, nor shall any water be taken from
such streams for industrial purposes, unless a permit has been granted by the executive council to the person, firm, corporation, or municipality constructing, maintaining, or operating the same.
28. See note 20, supra.
29. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Co-op. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 151 F.2d 20, 22-23
(D.C. Cir. 1945).
30. 151 F.2d at 26.
31. 151 F.2d at 24.
32. Id
33. IOWA CODE § 7771 (1930) contained a specific prohibition of the sort of diversion
proposed by First Iowa Co-op.
34. See 151 F.2d at 26. The Court of Appeals took pains to formulate a mode of analysis with which the preemptive capabilities of federal legislation could be measured.
35. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Co-op. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
36. 328 U.S. at 108.
37. 328 U.S. at 175.

27.
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FPC was satisfied those state
the particular state, only insofar as the
38
requirements had constitutional force:
The evidence required is described merely as that which
shall be satisfactory to the Commission. The need for compliance with applicable state laws, if any, arises not from this
federal statute but from the effectiveness of the state statutes
themselves. 9
The Supreme Court thus disagreed with the "plain purpose"
ascribed to Section 9(b) by the court of appeals, choosing instead to
rule-on grounds that a dual system of final authority would be "difficult," 40 "unworkable,"' 4 1 or "impossible" 4 2 -that federal authority
would ultimately control in the area, and state authority would (as it
must under the Supremacy Clause 43 and Commerce Clause 44 ) play a
secondary role.
The Court's construction of the FPA included this analysis:
The securing of an Iowa state permit is not in any sense a
conditionprecedent or an administrative procedure that must
be exhausted before securing a federal license. It is a procedure reqired by the State of Iowa in dealing with its local
streams and also with the waters of the United States within
that State in the absence of an assumption of jurisdiction by
38. Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed in his dissenting opinion that the effect of the
majority's holding was to allow the Federal Power Commission to attach a meaning to state
laws which theretofore might not have been construed by the state's own high court:
It is pertinent to recall the classic statement of the reason for leaving to the controlling interpretation of local courts the meaning of local law: "to one brought up
within it, varying emphasis, tacit assumptions, unwritten practices, a thousand influences gained only from life, may give to the different parts wholly new values
that logic and grammar never could have gotten from the books ....
Before conffict can be found between federal and State legislation, construction
must be given the State legislation. Avoidance of conflict is itself an important
factor relevant to construction. And so, construction of State legislation relating to
the matters dealt with in the Federal Power Act is subtle business and a subtlety
within the duty, skill, and understanding of State judges.
See 328 U.S. at 185-87 (dissenting opinion).
39. 328 U.S. at 178.
40. 328 U.S. at 168.
41. Id
42. Id
43. U.S. CONST. art. IV, 2:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every
state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to
the contrary notwithstanding.
44. See Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 25. (Johnson, J., concurring):
There was not a State in the Union, in which there did not, at that time, exist a
variety of commercial regulations;. ... By common consent, those laws dropped
lifeless from their statute books, for want of sustaining power that had been relinquished to Congress.
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the United States over the navigability of its waters.4 5
The record of the debate in Congress over the FPA, however,
reveals this quote from one of the Act's chief sponsors:
If we make it one of the conditionsprecedentto the granting
of a license that the applicant has complied with the requirements of State law as to bed, banks, diversion,46 and use of
water, we are most assuredly not infringing any State's right
in that respect, but are definitely insisting that the State's rules
of property as to water, bed, and banks must have been fully
complied with or a license can not issue.4 7 (emphasis added).
It appears the high court either failed or refused to notice the
clearly expressed legislative intent regarding state enactments and
water power facility siting. In this instance, stare decisis charges the
states with difficult regulatory doctrine.
IV.

GROWTH OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY

Because of the language of Section 9(b), federal courts have expressed reluctance to totally pre-empt state regulatory power that, after
First Iowa, they still possess. In 1977, for example, a federal judge
commented: "Congress was careful not to cast the regulation of hydro' But the functional judielectric plants in an entirely federal mold."48
cial use of FirstIowa has, in practicality, proven exactly the opposite.
For example, in FloridaLime andAvocado Growers,Inc., v. Paul,4 9 the
United States Supreme Court relied on FirstIowa for the proposition
that federal and state authority may operate independently in the same
field if such independence would not impair "[flederal superintendence
in the field." 50 The critical consideration to the Court was not the possibility of conflict between federal and state law in theoretical purpose,
but whether the effects of state law might infringe on the federal prerogative.
In the late 1940s,"' the city of Tacoma, Washington, received a
permit from the FPC to construct two hydro-electric dams on the Cowlitz River. The city intended to issue and sell utility revenue bonds to
finance construction of the dams, and to finance condemnation of certain property-notably Washington's Mossyrock Fish Hatchery and a
section of state highway-which would be inundated by the project.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

328 U.S. at 170.
See note 33, supra.
56 CONG. REc. 9110 (1918) (remarks of Rep. LaFollette).
Georgia Power Co. v. 54.20 Acres of Land, 563 F.2d 1178, 1200 (5th Cir. 1977).
373 U.S. 132 (1963).
373 U.S. at 142.
An exact date does not appear in the case as reported.
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Opposing construction of the dams were the state of Washington and
initially, the Washington State Sportsmen's Council, Inc..
By 1957, the various resulting lawsuits had formed what one judge
called a "Hydra-headed controversy, ' 52 which found its way, on two
occasions, to the Supreme Court of Washington. In one case, City of
Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma [hereinafter City of Tacoma],5 3 the
Washington court was faced with resolving two critical questions: 1)
Did a municipal corporation have the power to condemn state-owned
land already dedicated to a public purpose? 2) If such a power ordinarily did not exist, did the federal permit to construct the two dams)
confer the needed power upon the city?54 After holding that the city
did not possess by statute the power of eminent domain, the court held
that the FPA did not purport to confer such authority on a municipal
license-holder.5 5 The case presented, in fact, no issue of federal authority; the central question involved merely a lack of state statutory power
in the city. The significant question raised in FloridaLime andAvocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul was again presented in City of Tacoma:
does the refusal by the state of Washington to allow condemnation of
state-owned land make the grant of the federal permit meaningless, or
does such a refusal effectively intrude upon some aspect of federal
power? Although the Washington court refused to allow the FPA to
preempt a legitimate state regulatory scheme simply on the basis of that
scheme's effect on a federal permit, the United States Supreme Court
disagreed:
Consistent with the FirstIowa case. . we conclude that the
state laws cannot prevent the Federal Power Commission
from issuing a license or barthe licenseefrom acting under the
. 7 (emphasis added).
license
Hence, an attempted resistance to federal authority grounded
upon a classic assertion of state power--the power of eminent domain-was wholly overcome. Ironically, the municipality of Tacoma,
armed with the permit of a federal agency, had prevailed over the very
authority (the state of Washington) that gave it life as a functioning
governmental entity. State authority, in the end, had yielded where the
effect on an otherwise viable assertion of state authority infringed on
the federal prerogative. This was a far cry from the plan conceived
52. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 49 Wash. 2d 781, 307 P.2d 567, 572
(1957).
53. Id
54. 49 Wash. 2d 781, 307 P.2d at 572.
55. Id
56. 49 Wash. 2d 781, 307 P.2d at 577.
57. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958).
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merely to allow the construction of water power facilities on the nation's rivers and streams.
V.

FEDERALISM:

CONTEXT FOR CONFLICT

The constitutional truisms that 1) the federal government is one of
delegated powers, and 2) power not delegated to the federal government, nor prohibited the states, resides in the states,58 on their face lead
to the conclusion that the primary governmental authority in American
life is state government. Certainly the matter is not so easy. A more
realistic perception of the federal/state relationship-that relationship
we designate as federalism-is that the federal government and the
various states are "[pitted against one another for authority or jurisdiction, with the judiciary as the final arbiter."59 Within the area of facility-siting regulation, we shall see that if a dominance has evolved, it

does not weigh on the side of the states.
One should not causally conclude that federal preemption of state
authority receives a preference in the law. In Parker v. Brown, 60 Mr.
Justice Stone wrote:
In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitu-

tion, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed
control. . . is not lightly to be
purpose to nullify a state's
61
Congress.
to
attributed
In theory, then, preemption occurs specifically, where there is 62a
to displace state authority,

clear manifestation of congressional intent
or impliedly, as in situations where the aim of a federal regulatory
scheme could not admit a collateral assertion of state authority. 63 A
judicial hesitance to finally end the exercise of state authority in areas
which could6" be the subject of unilateral federal control clearly appears in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery,6 5 where the United States

Supreme Court held that the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(as amended) did not reach states acting qua states, even though
58. U.S. CONST. amend. X:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
59.

Mills and Woodson, Energy Policy: a Testfor Federalism, 18 ARiz. L. REV.405

(1976).
60. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
61. 317 U.S. at 351.
62. See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733 (1949).
63. See Pennsyvlania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956).
64. For an illustration of the chronological growth of federal authority over inter- and
intrastate activities under the Commerce Clause, read Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1 (1824),
in conjunction with Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
65. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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viewed alone, the activity might have been appropriately subject to the
federal commerce power. Mr. Justice Rehnquist wrote "[w]e think
the states' 'separate and independent existthere would be little left of
66
ence'" to hold otherwise.
Judicial prejudice against plenary federal authority in resource

regulatory schemes becomes important when considered with the growing awareness of states' residents of first, the innate aesthetic and fragile
resources of their particular states, and second, the possible utilization

of those resources in efforts to solve national energy problems. One
author describes the situation like this:

[B]asically, the Western States are determined to acquire additional control over development activities within their borders regardless of whether such development occurs on

private, state, or federal lands. State interest in this matter
has reached the point where, in the absence of federal provi-

sions authorizing states to participate in and affect management decisions respecting exploitation of resources on federal
lands, the states are unilaterally seeking to assert jurisdiction
over such land.67

But if local efforts to control development on navigable rivers and
public lands are to be at all meaningful they must be evaluated in the
legal context of federal authority. For example, the territorial jurisdiction of a state traditionally has extended to the beds and banks of its
waterways, 68 even though those waterways may be "navigable" visa vis
the federal commerce power. However this authority was limited in
Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Company v. Briggs, [hereinafter
Briggs], 69 where the "public right of navigation"7 was held to be superior to the theretofore absolute property right of bed and bank owner-

ship.7'

This dominant interest of navigation, manifest in federal

authority, included "the right to use the bed of the water[s] for every
purpose which is in aid of navigation."7 " The logic of preserving to the
66. 426 U.S. at 851, citing: Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911).
67. Shapiro, EnergyDevelopment on the PublicDomain: Federal/StateCooperationand
Conflict RegardingEnvironmental Land Use Control, 9 NAT. REs. L. 397, 398 (1976).
68. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 230 (1845):
[T]his right of eminent domain over the shores and the soils under navigable waters, for all municipal purposes, belongs exclusively to the states within their respective territorial jurisdictions, and they, and they only, have the constitutional
power to exercise it. To give to the United States the right to transfer to a citizen
the title to the shores and the soils under the navigable waters, would be placing in
their hands a weapon which might be wielded greatly to deprive the States of the
power to exercise a numerous and important class of police powers.
69. 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
70. 229 U.S. at 87.
71. See Brown v. United States, 81 F. 55 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1897).
72. 229 U.S. at 87.
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federal government the actual oversight of free-flowing waterways in
the interest of commerce is readily understood. But "the interest of
navigation," through judicial decision, was later cast in the different
context of taking (condemning) river beds and banks to erect structures
which themselves could end actual navigation on any particular water-

way.
First, in Kohl v. United States, [hereinafter Kohl]7 3 , a federal
power of eminent domain, limited to the sphere of appropriate federal
action, was particularly recognized:
[W]ithin its own sphere, [the national government] may employ all the agencies for exerting [power] which are appropriate or necessary, and which are not forbidden by the law of its
being .. .. The right of eminent domain was one of those
means well known when the Constitution was adopted, and
employed to obtain lands for public uses. Its existence, therefore, in the grantee of that power, ought not to be questioned.74
It appears then that the commerce power and Kohl establish a federal right of eminent domain over navigable waterways to be exerted,
obviously, not over water, but over the beds and banks of various watercourses; the very area of regulation thought earlier to be the particular province of the states."

Secondly, the United States Constitution grants Congress the
power to "[e]xercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever...
for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other
needful buildings,' 76 (emphasis added) where the property thereby affected has been ceded to the federal government by a particular state.
In James v. Dravo ContractingCompany, [hereinafter James], the respondent contracted with the federal government for the construction
of certain locks and dams in Ohio's Kanawha River. The state sought
to subject the respondent to its Gross Sales and Income Tax Law, the
effect of which was to levy a 2 per cent tax on the gross proceeds of the
respondent's business. The critical issue presented for decision was
whether the state had jurisdiction to impose the tax.7 Consistent with
Pollard'sLessee v. Hagan,79 the Court affirmed that jurisdiction over
the bed of the Kanawha remained in the state of Ohio."0 But the Court
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

91 U.S. 367 (1875).
91 U.S. at 372.
See congressional debate, supra note 4.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
302 U.S. 134 (1937).
302 U.S. at 138.
3 How. 212 (1845). See also note 68, supra.
302 U.S. at 140, 141.
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also held that locks and dams were "other needful buildings" under
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.8 ' The jurisdiction of the state
was therefore limited by the federal government's right to improve the
bed of the Kanawha in the interests of navigation;8 2 this, in reliance on
Briggs. In a 5-4 decision, imposition of the tax was sustained on the
ground that it interfered with no strictly federal governmental function. 3 However the federal government's affirmative right to erect
dams in navigable waterways was firmly established, even though this
the acsame federal interest was initially limited to merely preserving
84
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CONCLUSION

I have watched for years the pendulum swing from excess of
liberality to a worse extreme of niggardliness, and, like the
dog in the manger, we could or would not eat the hay ourselves, neither would we allow the horse to eat it. We would
not, and no doubt wisely not, develop our water powers ourselves, neither would we pass laws under which private capital
properly regulated could safely be invested in water-power
development.8 5
The drafters of the FPA may have thought the traditional authority of individual states over non-navigable as well as navigable waterways would preserve meaningful state control over water power facility
construction. But judicial interpretation of the Commerce Clause and
the broad definition given the term "navigable" makes any such authority meaningless. Under Briggs, the authority is subject to a federal
interest in navigation which, under James, includes the affirmative
power to construct dams and other structures, state authority notwithstanding. Kohl gives this affirmative right greater meaning in view of
the federal government's sovereign right of eminent domain. Indeed,
City of Tacoma indicates that this power may be imparted to private
parties holding federal permits; recall that no state law can prevent the
FPC from issuing a federal permit, or bar the licensee from acting
thereunder. Resting at the base of this line of authority is FirstIowa,
which might be called the paradigm of judicial misinterpretation of
clear congressional intent. Nonetheless, the conclusion is inescapable:
federal power over hydro-electric facility siting is plenary.
A combination of energy scarcity and high energy demand has
81. See text and note 76, supra.
82. 302 U.S. at 140.
83. 302 U.S. at 161.
84. See generally, Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82
(1913).
85. 56 CONG. REc. 9112 (1918) (remarks of Rep. LaFollette).
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dealt our industrialized society a vicious blow. A related problem has
evolved in that energy resources, which may exist in scattered, sparsely
populated states, are sought for domestic and industrial use on a nationwide basis. The possibility that the resource-rich states may, as
"the dog in the manger," jealously protect their treasures indicates that
seriously divisive questions of federalism await us in the future. Perhaps we are apprised of what future outcomes will be by Mr. Justice
Jackson's simple analysis: "[Ojur economic unit is the nation."86
Charles J Seifert

86. Hood v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1948).

